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Voluntary Turnover, Job Performance,
Salary Growth, and Labor Market Conditions
The importance of employee turnover control depends on many
factors, including the relative supply of replacements in either the internal or
external labor market, the amount of training invested in the employee, and
the perfonnance level of the employee. In reference to the last factor,
several authors have argued that turnover, especially of low perfonners,
should not necessarily be assumed to represent a problem (Dalton, Todor, &
Krackhardt, 1982; Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986).
Thus, research is needed that identifies the conditions under which high
perfonners are most likely to voluntarily leave the organization.
However, theoretical models of employee turnover often yield no clear
prediction concerning the link with employee perfonnance. The March and
Simon (1958) model, for example, suggests that turnover is a function of
perceived ease of movement and perceived desirability of movement.
Perfonnance would be expected to have a positive influence on ease of
movement (actual and perceived), resulting in a higher probability of turnover
among high perfonners (Jacofsky, 1984).
The expected impact of perfonnance on perceived desirability of
movement is less clear. If the organization has a strong linkage between
perfonnance and pay, high perfonners should feel equitably treated and
satisfied, contributing to low perceived desirability of movement and less
probability of turnover (i.e., a negative relation between turnover and
perfonnance). In contrast, low perfonners might be more likely to leave
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because they could do better financially in organizations where pay was not
tied closely to performance. In the latter type of organization, low
performers would be more likely to stay than high performers (Le., a positive
relation between turnover and performance). The implication then is that the
nature of the organization reward system is likely to be an important
contingency in determining whether high performers will have a low or high
perceived desirability of movement (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Steers &
Mowday, 1981; Dreher, 1982; Jacofsky, 1984).
Therefore, in combining the effects of perceived ease of movement
and perceived desirability of movement, the net relation between turnover
and performance would be expected to be (a) positive in cases where the
pay--performance relation is weak, and (b) near zero in cases where the pay--
performance relation is strong, if the perceived ease and perceived
desirability of movement factors offset each other.
After considering these issues, Jacofsky (1984) suggested that there
will often be a curvlinear relation between turnover and performance, such
that turnover is most likely among both low performers and high performers.
She argued that low performers may be "pushed out" because of "actual or
perceived threat of administrative action" (p. 79). Based on the discussion
above, we would also expect greater turnover of a more voluntary nature
among low performers in cases where rewards (e.g., promotions, within-grade
pay increases) are tied to performance. In any case, Jacofsky's model seems
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to imply the assumption that (positive) effects of perfonnance on ease of
movement are unlikely to be counteracted by the (negative) effects of
perfonnance on perceived desirability of movement. This assumption seems
reasonable to the extent that pay and perfonnance are not closely linked.
Thus, a central question is "What is the typical relation between pay
and perfonnance?" A common response seems to be "small" (e.g., Lawler,
1981, 1989; Teel, 1986; Milkovich & Newman, 1990; see Heneman, 1990
for a review). For example, Lawler (1989, p. 151) comments that "All too
often only a few percentage points separate the raises given good perfonners
from those given poor perfonners." Similarly, he mentions the problem of
"topping out," which refers to the fact that many organizations use merit
increase guidelines that reduce the size of the merit increase for employees
higher in salary range or grade as a means of controlling costs (Milkovich &
Newman, 1990). Similarly, some merit increase guidelines also reduce the
frequency of within-grade pay increases for employees near the top of the
range (Milkovich & Newman, 1990), further reducing the pay--perfonnance
relation.
These types of factors may contribute to the perception of a weak
relation between pay and perfonnance. A survey by the Hay Group (1984),
for example, found that less than one-half of middle managers and
professionals thought that "better perfomers" received "higher pay increases
than average or poor perfonners" (p. 14). Where the perception is of a weak
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pay--performance link, pay satisfaction among high performers may be low.
Dyer and Theriault (1976) did, in fact, report lower pay satisfaction among
high performers, although they did not report information on the nature of
the reward system in their study.
Of course, merit pay increases (i.e., within-grade increases) are only
one factor contributing to overall salary growth over time. Promotions (i.e.,
between-grade increases) are another major determinant (Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1989). In fact, promotions often have a twofold effect. First,
there is typically a pay increase that goes with a promotion. Second,
however, the employee usually moves to a new pay grade where s/he will
most likely be in a lower relative position, thus having the opportunity to
earn larger and perhaps more frequent within-grade increases. Thus, the
impact of performance on promotions will have significant consequences for
the magnitude of the relation between performance and total pay growth.
In some cases, promotions may be more closely related to
performance than are within-grade pay increases (e.g., in union or civil
service jobs where within-job pay differences can be small or nonexistent).
In other cases (e.g., private sector managerial and professional jobs),
however, promotion decisions may be less closely linked to current and past
performance than to other factors such as potential, breadth of experience, or
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area of expenise.1 Although these can be justified as legitimate factors in
promotion decisions, high perfonning employees who have been passed over
and find themselves at the top of the salary range with little opponunity for
salary growth may perceive pay inequity and entenain the possibility of
leaving. In summary, pay (and pay growth) may not always be closely
related to perfonnance levels. The result may be an increased risk of losing
high perfonners.
In addition to the reward system, a second contingency factor that
may help explain the conditions under which turnover is more likely among
high versus low perfonners is the condition of the labor market. Carsten and
Spector (1987) repon that high unemployment rates reduce voluntary
turnover. In addition, job dissatisfaction and intentions to leave appear less
likely to translate into turnover when unemployment rates are high (Gerhan,
fonhcoming). Neither of these studies, however, examined whether turnover
of low and high perfonners was equally influenced by labor market
conditions. One hypothesis is that low perfonners may not have many
attractive alternative job opponunities unless there is a shonage of workers in
the labor market. In contrast, it may be that companies are always in the
market for "star" perfonners, regardless of overall employment demand in the
market or in their organization (Keller, 1984; McEvoy & Cascio, 1987). If
IGerhart and Milkovich (1989), for example. in a sample of managerial and professional
employees, found that performance was less closely linked to promotions than to overall pay
growth.
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so, the linkage between labor market conditions and turnover might be
strongest among low performers. In contrast, turnover among high
performers would be less responsive to labor market conditions.
In their meta-analysis of the relation between employee turnover and
employee job performance, McEvoy and Cascio (1987) found a weighted
correlation across 24 studies of -.28, suggesting that high performers were
less likely than low performers to leave. But, without access to data at the
individual level, McEvoy and Cascio (1987) were unable to conduct direct
tests of the curvlinearity hypothesis. However, since the McEvoy and Cascio
(1987) review, two studies have examined the curvlinearity issue (Jacofsky,
Ferris, & Breckenridge, 1986; Mossholder, Bedeian, Norris, Giles, & Feild,
1988). Both found support for a curvlinear relation such that low performers
and high performers were more likely to leave than average performers,
consistent with Jacofsky's (1984) model.
Neither of these two studies, however, reported on the extent to which
the two possible contingency factors identified earlier, (a) the reward system
and (b) the labor market, contributed to their finding of a curvlinear relation
between performance and turnover. McEvoy and Cascio (1987) attempted to
examine the effect of labor market conditions, but data limitations hindered
their efforts, leading them to call for future research on that issue.
The present study asks the following questions. First, which
performance groups are most likely to leave an organization? Based on the
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literature reviewed above, I hypothesize that:
Ht. There is a curvlinear relation between performance and
turnover. Specifically, turnover will be highest among low and
high performers, lower among average performers.
Second, what factors might help explain whether it is low, average, or
high performers that are most likely to leave? Alternatively stated, is the
turnover of high performers determined in the same manner as the turnover
of low performers? Based on the earlier discussion, I hypothesize that:
Hz. Turnover will be more strongly negatively related to pay
growth among high performers than among low performers.
H3' Turnover will be more strongly positively related to labor
demand among low performers than among high performers.
To test these hypotheses, I make use of a model used in an earlier
study (Gerhart, 1990) of a different organization. That model specifies total
salary growth to be largely a function of factors measured after the time of
hire such as average performance rating and length of service with the
organization. Factors such as education and other human capital factors are
most likely to influence starting pay level, rather than long-term pay growth.
Method
Sample
The sample was composed of all (N = 4,946) exempt employees hired
between 1983 and 1988 who were either (a) still employed in the
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organization as of January 1, 1990 (N = 3,393) or (b) had voluntarily
resigned prior to that date (N = 1,221). Employees separated involuntarily
were not included (N = 332). Included employees were distributed across a
number of different divisions and locations, but in each case, the product or
service was tied to the petroleum industry.
Measures
Voluntary turnover was coded 1 if the employee had resigned
voluntarily as of January 1, 1990. It was coded as 0 if the employee was
still employeed with the organization as of that date.
Average annual salary growth was defined as the percentage change
from the starting salary to the last observed salary, divided by the time
interval between the two salaries. As such, it reflects salary growth
stemming from both within- and between-grade (promotion) increases. The
mean amount of time between the first and last salary observations was 2.97
years. The mean annual average salary increase was 9.8% (6.1% adjusted
for cost of living changes). In 1989 dollars, the mean starting salary was
$28,549 and the last observed salary was $37,918. I also experimented with
adjusting salary growth for inflation using the consumer price index.
However, this generally reduced the relation with other factors. The likely
explanation is that inflation effects were already captured through inclusion
of another set of variables, year of hire dummies. These were included in
all models to adjust not only for inflation, but also for the nature of the
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labor market at the time each cohort was hired. In addition, the year of hire
dummies control for length of service (tenure) with the organization.
Average perfOImance rating represents the average of all performance
ratings received subsequent to the hire date. In several of the models,
average performance level categories were created to capture any nonlinear
relations or for examining possible interactions with other variables. The
performance scale ranged from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
Labor Demand was measured using infonnation available in the
annual Recruiting Trends report issued by Michigan State University
Placement Services (e.g., Shingleton & Scheetz, 1983). Somewhere between
600 and 1,000 organizations respond to the survey each year regarding their
college recruiting practices and plans. The key question used here for
assessing labor demand is "This year, what change, if any, does your
organization anticipate in the hiring of new college graduates?" The
responses are summarized to yield an expected percentage change in hiring
plans. Moreover, responses are reported separately for different categories of
employers. The data used in the present study pertain to hiring plans among
employers reporting themselves to be in the petroleum industry. The
construct validity of the hiring plans measure is supported by the fact that it
correlated .73 (p < .05, one-tailed test) over a 5-year period with actual
hiring in the organization studied. The correlation with separations, although
not statistically significant, was also in the expected direction, -.58.
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Analyses
Data on tenure with the organization were treated as survival (or time
failure) data (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980). To estimate the influence of the
independent variables on the survival probabilities, a proportional hazards
(PH) rate model was used (Cox, 1972). Applications of the PH model to the
study of employee turnover (Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1989) and employee
absenteeism (Fichman, 1989) are available. This model is panially
parametric in the following sense. It does not impose any distributional
assumptions on the data. However, it does assume that hazard functions
(i.e., the probability of turnover, conditional on tenure) at different levels of
an independent variable are proportional to some unknown baseline function.
Its advantage is that it makes use of information on survival time (i.e.,
tenure), rather than using a simple dichotomous turnover dependent variable.
To test for an interaction between labor demand and average
performance rating in influencing turnover, the following approach was used.2
First, hazard rates were estimated based on an equation containing only year
of hire dummy variables, separately for each performance category. Second,
the hazard rate function (i.e., turnover probability at each tenure level) was
estimated for each year of hire cohort. Third, the year corresponding to each
tenure level was identified by adding the years of tenure to the hire year.
2J)ata on employees hired in 1988 were excluded from these analyses because there was not sufficient
time for labor market demand to vary.
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Founh, the labor demand data (described above) for each year were arrayed
in a matrix with the corresponding hazard rate for that potential year of
leaving. Thus, the matrix for each performance category would appear as
follows:
Hire Year Tenure Potential Hazard Labor Demand
Year of Rate
Turnover
1983 1 1984 hI LDI
1983 2 1985 hz LDz
1983 3 1986 h3 LD3
1983 4 1987 h4 LD4
1983 5 1988 hs LDs
1983 6 1989 h6 LD6
1984 1 1985 hI LDI
1984 2 1986 hz LDz
1984 3 1987 h3 LD3
1984 4 1988 h4 LD4
1984 5 1989 hs LDs
1985 1 1986 hI LDI
1985 2 1987 hz LDz
1985 3 1988 h3 LD3
1985 4 1989 . h4 LD4
1986 1 1987 hI LDI
1986 2 1988 hz LDz
1986 3 1989 h3 LD3
1987 1 1988 hI LDI
1987 2 1989 hz LDz
Results
The first hypothesis, that the relation between turnover and
performance is curvlinear, was examined by using average performance
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categories in the PH model (see Table 1). As Figure 1 indicates, the relation
does indeed appear to be curvlinear. For comparison purposes, least squares
was used to fit a line to the mean predicted values that had been derived
from the PH model. The probability of remaining employed for at least four
years initially increases with performance, but then levels off. Further, in
the highest performance rating category, survival probabilities actually
decrease. The most dramatic difference from the linear function is at the
highest performance rating category. These findings suggest that the relation
between turnover and performance in this sample is not linear, but rather is
approximated better by a curvlinear function, thus providing support for HI,
One possible explanation for this finding would be a weak relation
between performance and salary growth. Table 2 reports two sets of
estimates of this relation. The first equation treats the relation between
salary growth and performance as linear. The second equation uses
performance categories to allow for a possible nonlinear relation. The
predicted values obtained from each equation appear in Figure 2. It shows
that salary growth increases rapidly at lower performance levels, but levels of
near the middle of the performance range. The salary growth predictions for
the top performance categories do not differ noticeably between the two
equations.
However, it is interesting to note that using the equation with
performance categories, predicted salary growth essentially peaks at an
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average performance rating of 2.5 and then levels off. Thus, for example,
there is vinually no difference in salary growth between an employee with
an average performance rating of 2.5 and an employee with an average
performance rating of 5.0. To the extent that high performing employees are
aware of this fact, they may not feel equitably treated. These diminishing
returns to performance may help explain the corresponding diminishing
survival probabilities depicted in Figure 1.
As a more formal test of the possible interaction between salary
growth and performance, two equations were estimated. The first contained
only main effects for performance, salary growth, and the year of hire
dummy variables. The second equation added terms for the cross-products of
the salary growth and performance categories. Comparison of the two
equations revealed a statistically significant interaction between salary growth
and performance (Chi-square = 74.19, degrees of freedom = 8, p < .001).
To examine the nature of the interaction., the relation between
turnover and salary growth was estimated separately for each performance
category. As Table 3 indicates, the relation between salary growth and
turnover is much stronger at higher performance categories, providing suppon
for Hz. In other words, turnover decisions of high performers depend more
strongly on their salary growth experience than do turnover decisions of low
performers. This suggests that organizations need to be especially concerned
with equitable salary growth among its top performers.
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The third hypothesis, that perfonnance and labor market conditions
interact to detennine turnover, was tested by examining the relation between
hazard rates and labor demand as a function of perfonnance category. As
Table 4 indicates, the highest con-elations between labor demand and
turnover occur among employees in the four lowest perfonnance categories.
The lowest correlations occur among employees in the two highest
perfonnance categories. In other words, labor demand influences turnvover
of low perfonners more strongly than the turnover of high perfonners,
supponing H3.
Discussion
The present findings suggest that the relation between employee
perfonnance and employee turnover is best examined in the context of
factors such as the perfonnance contingency of the reward system and labor
market demand. I found evidence to suggest that in cases where there is
little differentiation between high and average perfonners in salary growth,
there may be an increased risk of losing the top perfonners. In addition,
high perfonners, unlike low perfonners, may have alternative job
opponunities even in times of relatively low labor market demand.
Moreover, the present findings may understate the potential effects of
the reward system on turnover among high perfonners in other settings. The
petroleum industry is known as a high pay level industry. For example, Hay
Group (1986) reponed that the petroleum industry paid its middle managers
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18% above the all-industry average. Given this high pay level, it is possible
that high performing employees placed less emphasis on internal comparisons
than they might have in an organization where average pay was lower. In
the latter organizations, high performers would perhaps be more likely to
experience inequity, based on both internal comparisons and external
comparisons across industries. The result in such cases could be even higher
relative turnover among high performers.
The influence of labor market conditions may have also been related
to factors somewhat specific to the petroleum industry. Based on Bureau of
Labor Statistics data, total employment in the United States grew
approximately 20% over the 1983 to 1989 period. In contrast, combined
employment in the petroleum and chemicals industries decreased by
approximately 28%. Thus, during the period studied, the general level of
alternative job opportunities was small for those employees staying within the
petroleum and chemicals industries.
It is difficult to know what effects the low labor market demand
might have had on the results of the present study. For example, pressure
on low performers to leave "voluntarily" may have been higher than usual.
On the other hand, based on the finding that turnover among high performers
is relatively independent of labor market conditions, there may have been
little impact on the results for higher performers.
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Future research using data from multiple organizations would permit
an examination of whether differences in the performance contingency of pay
corresponds to differences in the performance levels of leavers. Our research
(Gerhart & Milkovich, forthcoming) clearly demonstrates that organization
pay strategies differ significantly, particularly in terms of how pay is
delivered (e.g., relative emphasis on base and bonus pay). Thus, it seems
likely that pay-performance relations may similarly differ. It would be useful
to see if the implication of the present study, that weaker pay for
performance relations increase turnover among high performers, could be
replicated using that type of multiple organization data set.
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Average Performance = 1.0 2.796** .159
Average Performance = 1.5 1.333** .160
Average Performance = 2.0 1.170** .073
Average Performance = 2.5 -0.196* .091
Average Performance = 3.0
Average Performance = 3.5 -0.719** .128
Average Performance = 4.0 -0.339* .159
Average Performance = 4.5 -0.562 .451
Average Performance = 5.0 0.905* .358
Chi-square 693
Degrees of Freedom 13
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TABLE 1. Voluntary Turnover and Average Performance Rating,
Proportional Hazard Rate Estimates
Coeff. SE
N = 4,946
Note: Equation also includes dunmy variables for year of hire.
Performance ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
* p < . OS ** p < . 01
Equation 1 Equation 2
Coeff. SE Coeff SE
Average Performance .0134** .0011
Average Performance = 1.0 -.0547** .0025
Average Performance = 1.5 -.0353** .0057
Average Performance = 2.0 -.0175** .0019
Average Performance = 2.5 .0046** .0020
Average Performance = 3.0
Average Performance = 3.5 .0070** .0023
Average Performance = 4.0 .0059* .0030
Average Performance = 4.5 .0115 .0075
Average Performance = 5.0 .0211 .0030
Intercept .0511 .0038 .0903 .0025
a2
.0678 .0860
N = 4,946
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TABLE 2. Average Annual Salary Growth and Average Performance Rating,
Regression Est~tes
Note: Equation also includes dwrmy variables for year of hire.
Performance ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
* p < .05 ** P < .01
SaJ.ary Growth Number of
Coefficient Observations
Average Perfoz:mance = 1.0 -10.38*** 77
Average Performance = 1.5 -16.78** 101
Average Performance = 2.0 -14.37*** 1247
Average Performance = 2.5 -13.16*** 1084
Average Performance = 3.0 -25.17*** 1708
Average Performance = 3.5 -16.40*** 666
Average Performance = 4.0
-38.69*** 327
Average Performance = '.5 -85.36* 45
Average Performance = 5.0 -66.60* 23
Turnover and Perfonnance
23
TABLE 3. VoJ.untary Turnover and Average Annual. SaJ.ary Growth, by
Average Performance Rating, ProportionaJ. Hazard Rate Estimates
N = 5,278
Note: Equation aJ.80 incJ.udes dUDmY variabJ.es for
Performance ranges from 1 (J.owest) to 5 (highest)
* p < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001
year of hire.
Average Performance = 1.0
Average Performance = 1.5
Average Performance = 2.0
Average Performance = 2.5
Average Performance = 3.0
Average Performance = 3.5
Average Performance = 4.0
Average Performance = 4.5
Average Performance = 5.0
Rote:
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TABLE 4. Correlation between Hazard Rate and Labor Demand, by Average
Performance Rating
Correlation of Hazard
Rate and Labor Demand
All Performance Categories .433t
.503t
. 494t
.474t
.469t
.378
.316
. 433t
.234
.298
Statistical tests of correlations are based on sample sizes of
either 17 or 18. The sample sizes for estimating the hazard rates
within each performance category are based on samples ranging from 12
to 921 employees. Performance ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)
t p < .05, one-tailed
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Figure Captions
r
Fi&Ure 1. Probability of Remaining Employed for at Least Four Years as a Function of
Average Performance Rating
Fi~ure 2. Average Annual Salary Growth as a Function of Average Penormance Rating
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